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ABSTRACT 
The Internet was designed under the assumption that end-hosts 
are  stationary  and  have  one  interface.  Current  mobile  devices 
have multiple network interfaces, such as Wi-Fi, LTE, WiMAX, 
and possibly Ethernet. Such diverse network connectivity can be 
used  to  increase  both  reliability  and  performance  by  running 
applications over multiple links sequentially, for a seamless user 
experience,  or  in  parallel,  for  bandwidth  and  performance 
enhancements. Users are also consuming Internet services from 
multiple  locations  and  devices,  such  as  smartphones,  tablets, 
laptops,  and  IP-enabled  TVs.  The  existing  networking  stack, 
however,  offers  almost  no  support  for  intelligently  exploiting 
such network, location and device diversity.  
Since,  most  Internet  devices  today  are  mobile,  we  propose  a 
unified  networking  architecture  that  makes  optimal  use  of  a 
heterogeneous dynamic environment, both in terms of networks 
and  user  devices.  The  system  core  functionalities  include 
mobility, multi-homing, multipath, and disruption tolerance. The 
system enables mobile nodes to make decisions about how and 
when  to  use  each  or  a  combination  of  networks,  in  a  secure 
manner.  With  this  new  architecture,  we  envision  a  shift  from 
current  applications supporting  a  single  network,  location,  and 
device  at  a  time,  to  applications  that  can  support  multiple 
networks, multiple locations, and multiple devices. 
 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
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C.2.2 [Computer Communication Networks]: Network 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Packet-based communications systems were originally designed 
without  considering  the  concept  of  mobility.  Mobile  Internet 
bandwidth consumption will soon surpass fixed line broadband 
[1]. Moreover, mobile users have developed very high expecta-
tions of their communication needs regardless of where they are 
located, how they are moving, what devices they are using, and 
which applications they are running.  Yet current networks are 
generally not designed to handle such expectations of mobility, 
which call for seamless network transitions, and session mobility 
persistence, as the user moves about even while changing devic-
es. 
The architecture proposed in this work is based on a user-centric, 
unified network design, which makes better use of heterogeneous 
networking environments, while providing transparent control to 
access networks and devices [2]. Heterogeneous networks can be 
different  network  technologies  or  multiple  administrative  do-
mains. The architecture introduces an enhanced networking stack 
comprised  of  additional  control  functions  for  each  networking 
layer, managed by a policy-based decision-making system that 
provides a seamless user experience. The network control func-
tion  provides  terminal  mobility,  multi-homing  and  multipath 
functionalities. The link control function provides network dis-
covery  and  handover  optimizations  functionalities.    And  the 
physical control function provides control of radio spectrum for 
optimal physical channel selection. Additionally, a control mid-
dleware module manages these control functions, and provides 
granular network access control, based upon user-defined poli-
cies, having various criteria, such as, cost, bandwidth, location 
and security, on a per-application basis. Moreover, the service 
providing network access is abstracted into two logical planes - 
infrastructure and service, by decoupling the physical infrastruc-
ture from the service-providing functionalities. The service plane 
provides mobility management, additional network information 
for optimal connectivity, service access control, and unified bill-
ing and accounting for all nodes. The infrastructure plane pro-
vides the actual physical network access.  
In this work, the architecture design and a prototype implementa-
tion is described, including a proposed security framework. As 
the  architecture  supports  a  heterogeneous  networking  environ-
ment, the proposed design attempts to unify the various authenti-
cation  schemes,  resulting  in  reduced  credential  management 
complexity.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 
describes the design goals of the architecture. Section 3 describes 
mobility and the security challenges associated with it. Section 4 
discusses an overview of the related work. Section 5 describes 
the architecture design. Section 6 describes secure heterogeneous 
access using the proposed design. Section 7 describes the imple-
mentation and the protocols used. The conclusions are presented 
in Section 8. 
  
2. DESIGN GOALS 
As all voice, multimedia, and data services are converging to IP, 
a  generalized  approach  is  required  to  understand  mobility 
communication  requirements  impacting  application  users, 
developers,  and  network  providers.  The  proposed  architecture 
design goals include:  
 
1) Seamless user experience: Users should not experience any 
degradation  of  service  when  a  change  in  network  point  of 
attachment,  network  type,  service  provider  or  device  occurs. 
Real-time  applications,  such  as  an  active  voice  or  video  call, 
should  not  experience  any  disconnections  or  delays  upon 
handover, either from one network service to another (e.g., LTE 
to Wi-Fi), or upon changing devices (e.g., from a mobile phone 
to a laptop). 
2) User and mobile node independence: Users and their mobile 
nodes  (MN)  should  be  decoupled  from  physical  network 
infrastructure.  Networks  are  heterogeneous  in  terms  of  access 
technologies (Wi-Fi, LTE, WiMAX, satellite), service providers, 
performance  and  cost.  Users  can  access  Internet  applications 
from  many  locations  (home,  office,  outdoors),  devices  (PC, 
smartphone, tablet) and from more than one network at a time.  
3)  Policy  management:  Users  should  be  able  to  control  their 
network access. Application developers should be able to select 
either static (pre-configured) or dynamically configured network 
access policies. For example, a user may decide to download OS 
upgrades, or upload videos, when network bandwidth is plentiful 
or  cheap.  Conversely,  voice  or  video  services,  or  interactive 
games, may require low-latency mobile connections. 
4)  Multi-device  support:  MNs  should  support  multi-device 
communication  sessions.  MNs  should  be  able  to  discover 
neighboring nodes, and their corresponding shared services, such 
as,  audio,  video  (camera,  display),  and  storage,  in  a  secure 
manner,  to  enable  ubiquitous  computing  for  a  next-generation 
multimedia experience. For example, a user can transfer a video 
feed  from  a  mobile  device  to  a  fixed  TV,  while  maintaining 
security associations, and application context. 
5)  Secure  communication:  There  should  be  a  well-defined 
security  model  for  connection  (resource  access),  context 
(protocols), and content (data) abstractions without introducing 
additional latency. For example, cryptographic credentials can be 
reused to reduce redundant operations. 
6)  Disruption  tolerance:  Applications  should  continue  to 
operate in the absence of network connectivity both short and 
long term, to provide resiliency and better user experience. For 
example, a file transfer to and from a cloud-based storage service 
can be controlled by user-defined policies that take into account 
network conditions and priority, delaying packet delivery until a 
suitable network becomes available. 
7)  Network intelligence:  MNs should  leverage  network-based 
resources  seamlessly,  for  making  better  network  selection 
decisions, and storing data packets for future deliveries. These 
resources  may  provide  additional  computation  and  storage, 
helping  MNs  to  reduce  energy  consumption.  For  example,  a 
service can store a user’s daily route geographic map of nearby 
networks, and based upon usage-pattern analysis, the service can 
delay data transfers, until either a high bandwidth, or a low cost 
network, becomes available.  
8) Backward compatibility: Existing legacy applications should 
work without any modifications. The standard networking socket 
API  should  be  adhered  to,  since  it  is  the  most  programing 
interface. 
 
The overall objective of the proposed architecture is to improve 
the quality and continuity of the mobile user experience. With 
these comprehensive goals, a shift from the traditional network-
centric  to  a  user-centric  approach,  in  network  architectures,  is 
implied. In this architecture, users and applications are able to 
determine what kind of network connectivity they want to use in 
terms of availability, resource consumption, bandwidth, cost, and 
QoS. 
 
3. SECURITY AND MOBILITY 
Mobile communications are vulnerable to interception and analy-
sis  by  third  parties.  Since  the  proposed  architecture  involves 
managing connections across heterogeneous networks, the most 
significant challenge is maintaining identity, confidentiality and 
integrity in a non-uniform security environment. For example, a 
device may transition from a secure LTE network to a public Wi-
Fi access point that may not support adequate protection mecha-
nisms,  and  consequently  render  communications  vulnerable  to 
attacks.  The  identification,  categorization,  and  prioritization  of 
applicable network threats helps define and enforce correspond-
ingly uniform security controls to mitigate them.  
 
3.1 Security Threats  
General security threats can be commonly described under the 
following  categories:  unauthorized  access;  eavesdropping  and 
traffic  analysis;  and  service  disruption  and  denial  of  service 
(DoS). Unauthorized access occurs when an attacker, using vul-
nerabilities in the communication protocol or user applications, 
gains access to restricted information (e.g., passwords, confiden-
tial files), and takes control of the system. Eavesdropping or net-
work  sniffing  is  a  network  attack  consisting  of  capturing  data 
packets transmitted by other nodes, and analyzing data content 
for  access  to  sensitive  information,  such  as  session  tokens,  or 
other kind of confidential information. DoS attacks aim to disrupt 
communication services, affecting a single node, a collection of 
nodes  or  the  entire  network.  These  attacks  take  advantage  of 
vulnerabilities in the protocol implementation, through protocol 
manipulation,  or  by  flooding  the  application  (or  service)  with 
bogus requests, such as reflection and amplification, resulting in 
blocking and replaying. 
 
Figure 1: Global Mobility and Security 
 
3.2 Mobility  
The maintenance of transport layer connectivity is a significant 
requirement  of  mobility  management,  resulting  in  a 
location/identity split, where an invariant identifier is mapped to 
the changing locations (IP addresses). A MN experiences local 
mobility  when  moving  within  a  single  administrative  domain, 
thus  the  network  maintains  the  IP  address  unchanged  across 
access  technologies,  because  mobility  is  managed  internally 
within the domain. Global mobility is defined when a MN moves 
across  administrative  domains,  resulting  in  new  IP  address 
acquisition,  in  each  domain.  In  order  to  maintain  MN 
reachability, new location updates need to be sent to an external 
Mobility  Manager  (MM)  service  that  can  act  as  a  location 
registrar, and a common rendezvous point, when both nodes are 
moving concurrently. In opportunistic mode, however, a MN can 
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send new location updates directly to a stationary Correspondent 
Node (CN), eliminating the need for MM support. 
 
In  local  mobility,  the  MM  is  managed  internally  by  a  single 
provider,  thus  uniform  and  consistent  security  controls  can  be 
implemented to prevent attacks. Whereas in global mobility, the 
typically external MM can be subjected to the attacks described 
above,  originating  from  networks that  do  not  necessarily  have 
common security guidelines. In a global mobility event, there are 
three  channels  vulnerable  to  these  security  attacks:  network 
access  for  new  IP  address  acquisition,  new  location  update 
message  forwarding  to  MM,  and/or  Route  Optimization  (RO) 
message forwarding to all active CNs, as shown in Fig. 1.  
 
4. RELATED WORK 
There have been several proposals that attempt to provide mobili-
ty, multi-homing, multipath, and flow management functionali-
ties by introducing “shim sub-layer” based solutions, and new 
APIs  to  provide  uniform  abstractions  to  upper  layers.  Legacy 
host support has been typically provided via an external network 
proxy  module,  either  natively,  or  by  protocol  extensions.  The 
solutions can be categorized as either end-host or end-site, based 
upon where the enhancements in the networking stack take place. 
End-host  solutions  require  changes  to  the  host’s  networking 
stack,  while  usually  not  requiring  any  network  infrastructure 
changes. End-site solutions require changes at the site’s exit rout-
ers without any changes to the end-hosts. End-site solutions, in 
general, require additional protocol-specific network elements for 
routing support.   
In the end-host category, at the network shim sub-layer, solutions 
providing  mobility,  multi-homing  and  multipath  support  were 
evaluated.  The  Multipath  Transmission  Control  Protocol 
(MPTCP)  [3]  provides  multipath  support  using  the  resource-
pooling principle, and opportunistic terminal mobility. MPTCP 
supports existing applications without any changes. The Stream 
Control  Transmission  Protocol  (SCTP)  [4]  provides  multi-
homing and multi-streaming functionality natively, while mobili-
ty support can be added using extensions [5]. Existing applica-
tions  require  modifications,  and  the  limited  firewall  support 
makes  SCTP  deployment  difficult.  The  Host  Identity  Protocol 
(HIP) [6] provides multi-homing, terminal and network mobility, 
and multipath support [7]. The location/identifier split required 
for mobility is implemented using the Host Identity Tag (HIT)
1, 
which acts as a constant identifier. In addition, it also provides 
native end-to-end security. The Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) [8] proto-
col enables mobility support in IPv6 by maintaining a permanent 
IP address (home address),  with optional security provided by 
IPsec.  The  multiple  care-of-address  registration  extension  [9] 
adds multi-homing support. For legacy hosts’ support, a network-
based mobility protocol called Proxy MIPv6 [10] has been also 
proposed. The End-to-end Connection Control Protocol (ECCP) 
[11] provides multipath and multi-homing support by abstracting 
the transport layer into data-delivery and connection control sub-
layers. ECCP can be seen as a hybrid of HIP and MIPv6 proto-
cols. At the link shim sub-layer, heterogeneous network discov-
ery process optimization and handover-delay reduction solutions 
were evaluated. The IEEE 802.21 Media Independent Handoff 
(MIH) [12] framework introduces the MIH Function (MIHF) as a 
network access abstraction, along with interface-specific standard 
control functions called Service Access Points (SAP). The hand-
over-delay can be further optimized using the MIH network in-
formation service (NIS), with additional network attributes, such 
as bandwidth, latency and cost. The Access Network Discovery 
and Selection Function (ANDSF) [13] is a 3
rd Generation Part-
nership Project (3GPP) standard, with similar functionalities as 
                                                              
1 128-bit cryptographic hash of the public key. 
the MIH framework. It defines LTE Evolved Packet Core con-
nectivity for a non-3GPP (Wi-Fi, WiMAX) access interface. It 
enables  seamless  vertical  handovers,  and  allows  operators  to 
provide MNs a list of preferred networks and corresponding ac-
cess  policies.  Dynamic  Spectrum  Access  (DSA)  [14]  physical 
shim  sub-layer  solutions  were  also  evaluated,  to  make  use  of 
potentially  additional  location-based  wireless  spectrum  (e.g., 
white spaces
2). DSA solutions enable access to additional spec-
trum by using cognitive radio methods [14] opportunistically, or 
by querying a network based geospatial spectrum database [15]. 
In the end-site category, at the network shim sub-layer, the Net-
work Prefix Translation (NPTv6/NAT66) [16] mechanism uses 
an address-rewriting procedure to support multi-homing natively, 
for IPv6 enabled hosts. At the link shim sub-layer, the Location 
Identification  Separation  Protocol  (LISP)  [17]  provides  multi-
homing, using link layer encapsulation, and traffic engineering 
support, using flow priority and weight attributes. LISP requires 
additional network element support, namely Ingress and Egress 
Tunnel Routers for traffic encapsulation and routing, resulting in 
a separate mapping overlay network [18]. Furthermore, for mo-
bility support, LISP requires Tunnel Router functionalities to be 
also implemented at the end-hosts, providing an exception to the 
expectation  that  end-site  solutions  do  not  generally  require 
changes to end-hosts.  
Based on our evaluation, the requirements to provide mobility, 
multi-homing, and multipath can be best fulfilled at the end-host, 
implemented in the network shim sub-layer. Also, the link shim 
sub-layer may enable common functions for network discovery 
and selection, and for reducing handover delay, in heterogeneous 
networking environments. 
 
Figure 2: Architecture Design 
 
5. ARCHITECTURE DESIGN 
In  the  previous  section,  several  proposals  for  improving  the 
current Internet architecture at the transport, network, link, and 
physical  layers  of  the  IP  protocol  suite  were discussed.  Using 
similar design considerations, this architecture design proposes 
an  enhanced  networking  stack  that  supports  terminal  mobility, 
multi-homing,  multipath,  and  disruption  tolerance,  as  core 
functionalities.  Each  networking  layer  is  enhanced  with  a 
corresponding  control  function,  managed  by  a  policy-based 
control  middleware  (CM).  The  control  functions  transfer 
information to upper layers via event propagation mechanisms, 
while the CM acts as a decision-making engine by processing 
control events, as shown in Fig. 2. The CM decisions result in a 
dynamic  change  in  the  system  default  behavior,  by 
supplementing or complementing an existing flow with possible 
parallel  connections.  The  CM  itself  is  independent  of  any 
                                                              
2 Frequencies allocated to a broadcasting service but not used 
locally. 
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transport, network, and link layer protocols. Additionally, a new 
network control event feedback API has been designed to provide 
network flow control to applications.  
 
The proposed architecture is further divided into two independent 
logical systems: the networking stack at the end-host level, and a 
suite of network-based services that assist the networking stack 
with external support for mobility and network information. As 
such, the system operates in two modes: assisted and opportunis-
tic. In assisted mode, the networking stack control functions lev-
erage  external  mobility  and  network  information  entities,  as 
shown in Fig. 2. In opportunistic mode, however, network dis-
covery can be performed locally, and the new location updates 
can be sent directly to a stationary CN, rendering the additional 
entities required for mobility and network information unneces-
sary.  
The  architecture  is  an  end-to-end  solution  that  requires  both 
communicating  nodes  to  support  identical  networking  stacks. 
Legacy  systems  backward  compatibility  support  is  proposed 
using a network-based proxy manager (PM) service that trans-
lates native packets (CM-aware) to static IP packets. 
Figure 3: Control Middleware 
5.1 Networking Stack 
Each  control  function  manages  the  corresponding  networking 
layer protocol. They are designed to be independent of the under-
lying protocols, and any new present or future protocol can be 
integrated, without changing the upper layers. The Physical Con-
trol Function (PCF) provides DSA functionality to enable access 
to  additional  wireless  spectrum,  based  upon  location,  network 
conditions, and application-specific requirements. The Link Con-
trol Function (LCF) decouples network and link layer function-
ality, and provides secure network access using interface specific 
authentication procedures. For example, in case of LTE, the LCF 
uses the Extensible Authentication Protocol – Authentication and 
Key Agreement (EAP-AKA’) [19] mechanism. It also provides 
handover  delay  optimization  capabilities,  such  as  link  status 
(up/down), link control, and monitoring. The Network Control 
Function (NCF) provides mobility, multi-homing, multipath, and 
adaptive flow management. The NCF provides to the transport 
layer a constant flow identifier that is mapped to the changing IP 
addresses,  for  each  active  flow,  without  causing  any  transport 
disconnections. The provision of NCF functionalities at the net-
work shim sub-layer results in a system wide effect, allowing all 
applications to work seamlessly and uninterruptedly. The NCF 
provides optional end-to-end security with a symmetric shared 
secret, derived from an asymmetric cryptographic step, for the 
mutual  authentication  at  the  beginning  of  a  session.  This  step 
requires  a  certificate-based public/private key-pair. The certifi-
cate can be either locally generated and self-signed, or issued by 
a Certificate Authority (CA), which is always preferable, to pre-
vent potential man-in-the-middle attacks.  
 
The CM is comprised of a policy engine (PE) that makes dynam-
ic decisions, based upon control event inputs from various attrib-
ute managers, as shown in Fig. 3. The PE evaluates a state-vector 
of these current control events against pre-defined policies, re-
sulting  in  a  modification  of  system  behavior.  The  state-vector 
defines a context at any given time, for example, location, time of 
day, and network type, cost, bandwidth, and latency. The CM’s 
attribute  managers  include:  The  network  manager  (NM)  that 
maintains and monitors all active network interfaces information. 
The NM also provides network information to the PE and exe-
cutes  the  network  handover  decisions.  The  security  manager 
(SM)  maintains  networks  and  devices  access  credentials,  and 
end-to-end communications public/private key pairs. The loca-
tion manager (LM) provides MN location information to the PE 
based upon GPS coordinates, or indoor positioning parameters, 
such as, Wi-Fi network identifier. The service-sharing manager 
(SSM)  provides  a  centralized  service  registration  function  for 
local network discovery. The system manager maintains system 
parameters such as CPU, bandwidth and battery usage, to enable 
application-specific usage constraints, such as maximum band-
width limit or battery utilization. And the queue manager main-
tains application specific queues to store data packets when there 
is no network connectivity, or a policy enforces no network us-
age, enabling application disruption tolerance support. The data 
store (DS) provides a structured key-value repository for each 
attribute  manager  respectively.  Additionally,  the  socket  proxy 
provides legacy application support by intercepting socket system 
calls. 
5.1.1 Policy Management 
Policies can be defined by the user, application or network. The 
policy control scope can be defined at three levels: global (sys-
tem-wide),  group  (set  of  applications)  or  local  (application-
specific),  which  allows  granular  network  access  control  for  a 
given application.  For example, a user can specify application 
updates delivery only when the location is home (Wi-Fi), or the 
network  cost  is  free,  and  time  is  after  midnight,  with  global 
scope. Conversely, a streaming application can be configured to 
always access one or higher bandwidth networks, irrespective of 
cost, but with only local scope. The policies are defined accord-
ing to a semantically configurable policy-specification language 
[20], and stored locally in the data store. At policy evaluation 
time, the attribute managers provide their control event inputs to 
the PE for processing, and network control enforcement. The PE 
maintains  a  mapping  of  all  active  socket  connections,  corre-
sponding to each application, and performs decisions based upon 
new control event states, e.g., new network, new location, new 
device,  time-of-day,  and  system  parameter(s)  status.  There  are 
three  possible  policy  evaluation  outcomes:  network  interface 
addition, for a new connection (or update of an existing connec-
tion), packet storage in application specific queues (in the queue 
manager) for later delivery if no network interface is selected, or 
new  connection  blocking,  if  no  suitable  network  interface  is 
available.  A  CM-enabled  MN  can  always  connect  to  the  best 
available network, based upon user policies, resulting in optimal 
seamless handovers without disrupting active applications, illus-
trating user-centric networking. For example, a MN may transi-
tions from a LTE to a Wi-Fi network based on best bandwidth, 
latency, signal strength, and location attributes.  
 
5.2 Network Services 
The networking stack may be assisted with network-based exter-
nal services to provide reliable mobility and additional network 
information support. The MM service, acting as an independent 
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centralized  location  registrar,  assists  the  NCF  to  provide  node 
reachability, while the node moves across domains, and acts as a 
rendezvous point, when both communicating nodes are moving 
concurrently. The Network Information Manager (NIM) service 
assists  the  LCF  with  additional  network  information,  such  as 
nearby  networks  presence,  bandwidth,  cost,  latency,  and  spec-
trum information for optimal network  discovery and selection. 
The NIM service helps reduce handover-delay and battery energy 
consumption.  It  may  also  use  analytics  to  provide  even  more 
refined  network  selection  capabilities  [21].  The  network-based 
PM  service  enables  incremental  deployment  of  the  system  by 
converting the enhanced networking stack packets into the tradi-
tional  stack.  These  services  provide  common  functionalities 
across heterogeneous administrative domains, organically defin-
ing a separate logical service plane.  
Figure 4: Service and Infrastructure Plane 
The traditional service provider user management services such 
as identity, billing and accounting are generally replicated across 
service providers. These services can be abstracted into a single 
service management logical entity that can be also deployed in 
the common service plane described above. This results in ser-
vice providers that are responsible for only technology-specific 
infrastructure access, while all the service functionality can be 
deployed  in  the  service  plane.  This  decoupling  of  the  service 
functionality from the infrastructure access, as shown in Fig. 4, 
allows a service provider to offer services across multiple infra-
structure providers, resulting in better management of heteroge-
neity  and  service  scalability.  Moreover,  a  single  infrastructure 
provider can host multiple service providers, thus maximizing the 
infrastructure  resource  utilization,  using  for  example,  software 
defined network mechanisms [22, 23].   
The new common service management entity, called the Access 
Manager (AM),  may  perform  identity  management  and  access 
control (authentication and authorization) for various administra-
tive domains, comprised of heterogeneous network technologies. 
The AM provides a federated identity management
3 [24] mecha-
nism,  using  the  Extensible  Authentication  Protocol  (EAP) 
framework [25]. Additionally, a Service Gateway (SG) function 
may provide an application layer firewall to further secure the 
interface  between  the  service  and  the  infrastructure  plane,  to 
prevent and mitigate the security threats discussed in Section 4. 
These service plane components are logical functions that can be 
deployed in a cloud environment. In this design, the service plane 
provides  a  control-plane  abstraction,  while  the  infrastructure 
plane provides a data-plane abstraction. 
6. HETEROGENEOUS ACCESS 
In  this  section,  using  the  previously  described  architecture 
components,  we  illustrate  how  a  MN  gains  secure  network 
access,  and  how  they  can  also  be  leveraged  to  enable  secure 
                                                              
3  Federation  of  identity  enables  the  portability  of  identity 
information  across  otherwise  autonomous  security  domains 
permitting users of one domain to securely access data or systems 
of  another  domain  seamlessly,  and  without  the  need  for 
completely redundant user administration. 
device-to-device communication in local networks. Secure access 
is  a  two-step  procedure  involving  discovery  and  trust 
establishment.  The  discovery  step  involves  the  infrastructure 
plane for location of the appropriate authentication service. The 
trust establishment step involves the service plane for credential 
verification  (authentication)  and  assignment  of  corresponding 
authorization level (access control).  
 
6.1 Network Access 
When a MN moves across infrastructure domains, the network 
access step has to be performed for every domain. Heterogeneous 
network access typically requires management of multiple access 
credentials.  For  members  of  a  service  federation,  using  EAP-
based mechanisms, however, network access methods can reuse 
the  same  pre-shared  keys,  as  the  service  providers  have  prior 
agreements with the infrastructure providers
4. For example, using 
the EAP-AKA’ [19] mechanism, the same pre-shared key of LTE 
can be also used for Wi-Fi network authentication. For visited 
networks outside of the service federation (e.g., a home network), 
the  network  access  methods  may  still  use  EAP-based 
mechanisms (e.g., EAP-TLS), while the credentials can be stored 
and managed in the SM. The CM, leveraging LCF, enables the 
logical  separation  of  the  network  authentication  process  into 
service and infrastructure access replicating the EAP pre-shared 
secret mechanism abstractions [19].   
 
 
Figure 5: Service Access 
 
6.1.1 Service Access 
In the first step, the CM initiates an authentication request using a 
LCF interface-specific access function. The access function pre-
sents  the  MN’s  pseudo-identity
5 to  the  infrastructure  provider, 
over a temporary access channel. The infrastructure provider’s 
Authentication  Authorization  Accounting  (AAA)  service  then 
maps  the  pseudo-identity  to  the  corresponding  MN’s  service 
provider.  Upon  service  provider  resolution,  the  AAA  service 
initiates the EAP authentication procedure between the MN and 
its  service  provider.  The  LCF  performs  the  authentication  and 
authorization  procedure  with  the  service  provider,  using  the 
symmetric  pre-shared  keys  configured  initially  in  the  MN  and 
AM respectively, as shown in Fig. 5. Upon successful authentica-
tion, the AM service returns a validated master session key, de-
rived from the initial pre-shared keys, along with optional net-
work access policies, to the infrastructure provider’s AAA server, 
so that the MN can initiate the infrastructure access procedures. 
 
                                                              
4 The communication between the service and infrastructure 
providers is assumed to be secure, as there is an a priori trust 
relationship established between them. 
5 The  pseudo-identity  string  is  used  to  hide  the  MN’s  real 
identity from the infrastructure providers during service access, 
thus enabling additional privacy. 
Network(Information(
Manager
Mobility
Manager
SERVICE(GATEWAY
Infrastructure(Provider(2
Service
Infrastructure
Access(
Manager
Infrastructure(Provider(1
Proxy
Manager
MN Access'Manager
EAP'Request'
[Authen4ca4on'Vector]
Verify'Request
Compute'RESPONSE EAP'Response'
[RESPONSE]''
Compare'RESPONSE'
User''Access'Policies'Selec4on
AAA
Authen4ca4on'Request'
EAP'Iden4ty'Request'
EAP'Iden4ty'Response'
[Iden4ty]
EAP'Success'
KEYS''
Store'KEYS EAP'Success'
Compute'KEYS
Infrastructure'Provider Service'Provider'
Iden4ty'Check'
Authen4ca4on'Vector'Genera4on' 
6.1.2 Infrastructure Access 
The MN can initiate, using the validated master session key gen-
erated in the above procedure, the physical infrastructure tech-
nology-specific access procedures.  A temporary security context 
is created between the MN and the network point of attachment 
using this key. After successful infrastructure authentication, the 
MN can initiate a DHCP request for an IP address.  
 
Subsequently, in assisted mode, the MN needs to also establish 
secure channels for each control function, with the corresponding 
service plane components; specifically the LCF with the NIM, 
and the NCF with the MM respectively. Furthermore, the pub-
lic/private key pair used in the asymmetric step, can be also used 
to generate shared secrets, for securing end-to-end communica-
tion channels using any of the well-known symmetric key-based 
security  protocols  (e.g.,  Encapsulating  Security  Payload  (ESP) 
[26], TLS, or application specific security). 
 
6.2 Device Access 
The proposed enhanced networking stack can also be leveraged 
to  enable  secure  device-to-device  service  sharing  in  local 
networks. It provides a general platform for application service 
sharing  using  the  publish/subscribe  mechanism.  Similar  to 
network access, device access can be abstracted into two logical 
planes – interface and service. The interface access abstraction 
provides  technology  specific  authentication  for  a  device,  by 
providing  device  discovery  and  trust  establishment  between 
devices. The device identity can be locally generated, from stored 
credentials  using  link  layer  access  technology  (e.g.  MAC 
address), or pre-assigned by a third-party. On the other hand, the 
service plane abstraction provides service registration, discovery, 
and authorization functionalities, to the locally running services, 
using the SSM in the CM as described in Section 5.1 
 
The NM coordinates with the LCF to obtain a temporary device 
access channel, for performing authentication. Upon successful 
authentication, the PE can signal to all the locally registered run-
ning services the new device availability status, and may enforce 
application-specific  device  policies.  Subsequently,  applications 
can start using the newly discovered local network services. For 
example, users can transfer a video stream from a smartphone to 
an IP-enabled TV if the streaming services are compatible. 
 
7. IMPLEMENTATION 
The enhanced networking stack prototype was implemented us-
ing a Linux kernel (version 3.2.21). The LCF used the ODTONE 
open implementation of the IEEE 802.21 MIH framework [28], 
with the corresponding NIS service, which was deployed as the 
NIM entity. The NCF was implemented using a dual-stack con-
figuration of the HIP [29], and MIPv6 [30] protocols and their 
corresponding MM support implementations.  In the HIP case, 
the MM is called Rendezvous Server (RVS), while in the MIPv6 
case it is called Home Agent (HA). The dual-stack configuration 
enables a gradual deployment for HIP, while providing backward 
compatibility  with  IPv6  hosts.  The  NCF  provides  end-to-end 
security using the ESP [26] protocol
6. In the HIP case, a secure 
channel is established using the shared secret derived from the 
native Base Exchange (BEX)
7 mechanism, while in the MIPv6 
case, the IPsec Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) protocol is used.  
 
                                                              
6 Security is natively implemented in HIP, while in MIPv6 it is 
optional. 
7 The  BEX  mechanism  is  a  four-way  handshake  that  takes 
place between two communicating nodes to establish a shared 
secret using Diffie-Hellman mechanism. 
The CM including the PE and the attribute managers were im-
plemented in user-space, using an event-driven architecture. The 
socket proxy was implemented using a SOCKSv5 open imple-
mentation  [31].  The  PM  support  was  implemented  using  the 
SOCKSv5 relay mechanism.  
 
In  the  current  prototype,  only  the  NM,  SM,  and  LM  attribute 
managers have been implemented. The LCF and NCF user-space 
protocol controllers were modified to communicate with the NM 
directly.  The  NM  maintains  and  monitors  network  interfaces 
using the LCF user-space controller. A Trusted Access Service 
(TAS) table is maintained and dynamically updated by a service 
provider and/or user. The TAS table stores the following access 
service  (network  or  device)  information:  service-identifier,  au-
thentication procedure, service type, credentials, cost, bandwidth, 
and access history. The SM maintains an Access Credential table 
with the following information: service-identifier, type, creden-
tial, name and additional information (location).   The LM was 
implemented using a command line interface to masquerade as 
the input from a GPS-based device. 
 
To initiate a new connection, the CM selects the NCF protocol 
based  upon  the  CN’s  destination  address  (HIT,  IPv6,  or  IPv4 
address). As a default, and when both communicating nodes sup-
port  HIP,  a  flow  is  always  configured  with  HIP.  Conversely, 
when the destination address is only IPv6 enabled, the flow is 
configured with the MIPv6 protocol. For legacy systems having 
only IPv4 support, the PM service is used for protocol transla-
tion. 
 
Figure 6: Control Middleware and Mobile Handover  
 
7.1 Mobile Handover  
A handover is a two-step process: link layer pre-authentication 
and acquisition of new IP address, and mobility control protocol 
signaling. As discussed in Section 3, a handover requires three 
entities to communicate securely, namely, the MN, CN and MM. 
 
For optimal network connectivity, the NM is constantly monitor-
ing the relevant network performance attributes, such as signal 
strength,  latency,  cost,  and  available  bandwidth.  If  any  of  the 
attributes’ values fall below a minimum, or exceeds a maximum 
threshold (such as minimum signal strength, or maximum cost), 
the NM triggers a network control event and forwards it to the 
PE, as shown in Fig. 6. The PE evaluates each active applica-
tion’s policies, and makes a candidate network selection decision 
for a handover (if any). Subsequently, the PE checks the network 
type, and requests the SM for any stored access credentials, of the 
candidate  network.  The  PE  signals  the  NM  to  perform  pre-
authentication  and  mobile  handover.  The  NM  commands  the 
LCF to perform network authentication by following the same 
procedure described in Section 6.1. On successful authentication, 
the LCF signals the authentication result to the NM. The NM 
requests a new IP address, and subsequently, signals the respec-
Transport
Network
Policy2Engine
Network2Manager Security2Manager
Network2Control
Link2Control
MM
AM
1
2 3 4
Link
Authentication
Binding2Updates
2Network2List
Network2X
6
5
2User
Kernel 
tive NCF protocols to perform the new location update (IP ad-
dress), to the corresponding MM. In the HIP case, the RVS and 
the CN are notified using the LOCATOR parameter in the HIP 
UPDATE message [5]. In the MIPv6 case, a BU message is sent 
to update the HA, and the Route Optimization
8 (RO) process is 
performed for all flows. In opportunistic mode, when there is no 
MM support, HIP may send location updates directly to all active 
CNs, and in the MIPv6 case, the RO process can also be per-
formed directly, without HA intervention [27]. 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
A  unified,  context-aware  mobility-enabled  architecture  design 
has been presented, as an evolution of the traditional networking 
stack.  This  enhanced  stack  is  complemented  with  a  control 
middleware that abstracts networking complexity, and provides a 
policy-based  decision  making  system.  The  policies  take  into 
account  context  information,  such  as  location,  cost,  time  and 
bandwidth, and override the system defaults, providing granular 
network access control, on a per-application basis. The system 
enables the provision of native mobility capabilities to perform 
seamless  handovers,  in  a  heterogeneous  environment,  and 
provides user and mobile node independence, from network and 
access technologies. The architecture also abstracts the physical 
service-providing  network  into  separate  planes,  based  upon 
infrastructure and service management criteria. This decoupling 
enables  service  providers  to  offer  services  across  multiple 
infrastructure  providers,  resulting  in  better  management  of 
heterogeneity, and service scalability. Last, a generalized security 
framework for heterogeneous environments was proposed, using 
a  federated  identity  management  scheme,  with  the  Extensible 
Authentication  Protocol  mechanism  for  network  and  device 
access.  Asymmetric  cryptography  was  used  to  secure  mobility 
events, and we demonstrated that it could be reused for the end-
to-end channels and applications. 
 
9. FUTURE WORK 
Policy definition languages will be evaluated and a formal speci-
fication proposed. The networking stack will be enhanced with 
the  PCF  implementation,  including  a  location-based  spectrum 
availability database. A system evaluation test-bed will be built 
for  performance  measurements.  Additionally,  the  networking 
stack will be ported from the current Linux version to an Android 
based system.  
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